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Abstract - According to the “Neoclassical” approach, stemming from the Tiebout 
model, the main advantage of federalism lies in the possibility that individuals with 
similar tastes, including those related to risk-aversion and the provision of public 
goods, can cluster in the same jurisdictions. The starting point of this paper is a 
criticism of this approach. While the main advantage of federalism is related to the 
possibility of clustering heterogeneous individuals, the assumption of costless 
movement from one State to the other implicitly implies that individuals are 
homogeneous in some of other important characteristics. For instance, individuals, 
facing low mobility costs must have very minor cultural and linguistic differences. 
This hypothesis may approximate the U. S. situation but clashes with the case of 
European Union. Since Cultural-linguistic standardisation and the social protection 
can be regarded as two alternative insurance devices (one increasing the probability of 
alternative employment and the second providing some assistance in case of dismissal 
from the present employment) a culturally diverse Europe must necessary rely more 
on the Welfare State than the United States. The comparison with the U. S. clarifies 
the paradoxical problem of European integration. On the one hand, social protection is 
more necessary when cultural-linguistic differences make it expensive to cultural 
standardisation as a substitute for it. On the other hand, social insurance among 
different regions is more unlikely to be accepted when these cultural differences 
prevail.  We argue that a possible way out of this dilemma is a system of mutual 
insurance among the European national welfare systems.  
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  According to the “American-Neoclassical” approach, stemming from the 
Tiebout (1956) model, the main advantage of federalism lies in the fact that 
individuals with similar tastes, including those related to risk-aversion and the 
provision of public goods, can cluster in the same jurisdictions. According to this 
view, federalism can favour the maximum differentiation of the characteristics of the 
individuals clustering in the different states. The starting point of this paper is a 
criticism of this approach. While the main advantage of federalism is related to the 
possibility of clustering heterogeneous individuals, the assumption of costless 
movement from one state to another implicitly implies that individuals are 
homogeneous in some other important characteristics. For instance, the hypothesis 
that individuals face low mobility costs involves that they have very minor cultural 
and linguistic differences. This is not the case in Europe, where cultural-linguistic 
differentiation is high and federalism is often associated to the protection of the 
cultural specificity of certain regions. 
 Cultural-linguistic  standardisation  and the social protection given by national 
welfare states can be regarded as two alternative insurance devices: the first increases 
the probability of alternative employment while the second provides some assistance 
in case of dismissal from the present employment
1. A Europe that lacks the horizontal 
cultural standardisation of the U.S. must necessary rely more on the welfare state than 
a country like the United States that is characterised by a very large market with low 
mobility costs. One would expect that in Europe the welfare state should act as a 
substitute for low horizontal cultural homogenization – an expectation that is 
consistent with the more relevant role of European states in social protection. 
  The comparison with the U. S. clarifies the paradoxical problem of European 
integration. On the one hand, social protection is more necessary when cultural-
linguistic differences make it expensive to cultural standardisation as a substitute for 
it. On the other hand, social insurance is more unlikely to be accepted when these 
cultural differences prevail. While a full-blown European system of Social Insurance 
is likely to be unfeasible, the process of economic integration makes it more difficult 
for the increasingly specialized national economies to insure one sector against the 
other and to continue to provide the type of social insurance that was traditionally 
supplied by National welfare states. We argue that a possible way out is a system of 
mutual insurance among the European national welfare systems.  
                                                 
1 A formal model examining the roles of social protection and cultural standardisation as 
alternative insurance devices is developed in D’Antoni and Pagano (2002) where it is also 
argued that Europe, taken as a whole, is likely to be very far from the optimal mix between 
these two policies. Bowles and Pagano (2003) develop this framework to analyse the 
contrasting interests of “cosmopolitans” and “provincials”. Arachi and D'Antoni (2003) argue 
that, if the risks of the workers who have made human capital specific investments in 
particular sectors are taken into account, the case for social insurance can get stronger as 
capital markets integration takes place, despite the increase in the distortionary effect.    The paper is structured as follows: 
  In section 2 we contrast the “Neo-Classical-American” view of federalism 
with the one that we believe to be closer to the needs of a culturally diverse Europe.  
  In section 3 we show how economic integration and market mobility at 
national level were greatly favoured by “institutional complements,” such as the 
existence of an undisputed dominant high culture and the loyalty to a single political 
unity. Similar features characterised the United States of America but cannot be taken 
for granted in contemporary Europe taken as a whole. 
  The focus of section 4 is on the two instruments through which national 
governments insured their citizens against the risks of the mobile market society: 
social protection and cultural-linguistic standardisation.  We consider the difficult 
puzzle that the relations of complementarity and substitution between these two 
insurance devices create for Europe and how, in this respect, the European case is 
polar to that of United States that, unlike Europe, is characterised by high horizontal 
cultural homogeneity among states (and, because of many decades of immigration, by 
lower vertical homogeneity).  
  In the fifth section, we consider a possible model of “mild European 
federalism”, which combines some degree of cultural integration with some defence 
of cultural diversity and some protection against “forced” economic mobility.  
  Finally, in section 6, we argue that European political institutions must support 
national welfare states. Their capacity to provide social insurance would otherwise be 
eroded by the productive specialization that is entailed by the process of European 
economic integration and, more generally, by globalization.   
 
 
2. The limits to the competitive view of federalism 
 
In the neo-classical tradition stemming from the Tiebout (1956) model, 
federalism is claimed to be an effective way through which citizens can get 
arrangements for taxes and public goods provisions that are as close as possible to 
their preferences. If the welfare state is considered an insurance mechanism against 
the various hazards of life including health, skills redundancy and market fluctuations, 
federalism could solve the problems that arise from the existence of differences 
between tastes for state intervention and for redistribution that individuals, with 
different wealth and different risk aversion, are very likely to have.  A federal state 
offers different jurisdictions among which the agents can choose. Thus, individuals 
with similar tastes for the “degree” of intervention of the welfare state can cluster in 
the same jurisdiction. According to this view, some contrasts, which characterize 
modern democracies, can be overcome by a market mechanism for the demand and 
supply of state arrangements. This view of federalism relies on the neoclassical model 
and, in particular, on the Tiebout model for the supply of public goods according to 
which people can vote with their feet. It can lead to the extreme conclusion that the 
different states should show little respect for their own minorities because both the 
majority of the community and the minority may gain if each one of them is 
organized in different jurisdictions according to its own community values
2.   
                                                 
2 This view originates from Tiebout's (1956) paper on local public goods. Some of the 
extreme logical consequences of this theory can be found in Alesina and Spalaore (1997). For 
a complete survey see Innam and Rubinfield (1997). A clear and concise analysis of this 
problem can be found also in Part II of Cooter (2000). 
  2Market mobility guarantees the individuals against the hazards of their 
production activities in two ways. In the first place, individuals can find other 
employments if their skills become redundant where they are. In the second place, the 
market for jurisdictions may offer more redistributive arrangements for the most risk-
averse individuals. In general, mobility and competition in both the private and public 
sectors can guarantee better arrangements for all the individuals. 
Such a mix of neo-classical model and of some aspects of the American 
federalist experience can, however, be a very dangerous guide for the institutional 
design of the European Union. The Tiebout (1956) model relies on the idea that the 
costs of mobility are zero - a theoretical abstraction that can, perhaps, provide some 
insights for the American society where mobility costs are relatively low but it is at 
odds with the European situation, where linguistic differences and other types of 
community ties make mobility very costly. In Europe federalism is often advocated 
by communities as a way of protecting sunk investments, such as their language and 
their ethnic investments, against the threats of an increasingly mobile society. It is 
rarely seen as a means for opening opportunities for people to move towards 
jurisdictions that are closer to their tastes.   
The shortcomings of the neoclassical view of federalism for the European case 
are also related to some more general limitations of this model. While federalism is 
considered a way of enhancing diversity in the population (by clustering people 
according to their characteristics), this view relies on low mobility costs that can only 
hold if individuals are homogeneous in other relevant respects. For instance, if 
individuals are homogeneous in their linguistic characteristics, their mobility is 
enhanced and they could easily cluster according to the welfare provision offered by 
the different states. In general, the homogeneity in one dimension can favour the 
heterogeneous clustering in other dimensions: if the individuals are homogeneous in 
terms of their preference for welfare provisions, their mobility among jurisdictions is 
enhanced in other dimensions and they can more easily cluster according to their 
linguistic and ethnic characteristics.  State competition is rather limited; in many 
cases, it is possible in some spheres only because some monopoly- possibly a cultural-
linguistic monopoly- has been established in some other spheres.  
 
 
3. Cultural-linguistic standardisation and individual mobility: a 
multiplicity of institutional equilibria 
 
The neoclassical model can be criticized for a failure to understand the 
complementarities
3 existing between heterogeneity in some domains and homogeneity 
in some other dimensions. However, this criticism can be deepened by arguing that 
the traditional view fails to see the market as an institution that has required a long 
process of linguistic, legal and customary standardisation and has, in turn, induced a 
further enhancement of this process. A fair degree of cultural-linguistic 
standardisation is wrongly taken for granted while it is a crucial institutional 
precondition for the working of both “political” and economic markets. Indeed, the 
                                                 
3 On the concept of institutional complementarity see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Aoki 
(2001). Even if they do not use the term “institutional complementarity”, according to Aoki’s 
generous acknowledgement (2001, p. 396) Pagano (1993) and Pagano and Rowthorn (1994) 
are also “two of the earliest analytical contributions to institutional complementarity". 
  3national state has greatly helped to homogenize the individuals in important cultural-
linguistic dimensions and create the conditions for a mobile market society. 
Contrary to the neoclassical story the development of markets has not been 
associated only with increasing diversity but mostly with a great demand for 
standardisation. Indeed, it has often come together with a growing intolerance for 
linguistic and cultural diversity.  
Pre-market agrarian societies were very often characterised by both horizontal 
and vertical diversity. The dialect spoken in one village could well differ from the 
dialect spoken in the next village while in the same village the serf, the priest and the 
lord would all speak different languages. However, while linguistic diversity was 
itself a product of geographically and socially immobile economic relations, it 
enhanced their immobility, stabilising the roles that were very often peacefully 
transmitted from fathers to sons and from mothers to daughters: the way of speaking 
was enough to understand the particular slot of society where each individual should 
fit. Linguistic diversity and social/geographical immobility were complementary and 
self-reinforcing elements of a very stable institutional equilibrium. One should not be 
surprised at the fact that these institutions have characterised such a disproportionate 
share of the “civilised” history of human kind. One should rather wonder how it was 
possible for such a stable equilibrium to eventually break down and for societies, 
characterised by linguistic and cultural homogeneity and by social and geographical 
mobility to finally emerge.   
Indeed, the change was only possible if and when a state (a potential national state) 
had spread a high culture (characterised by a written language) among the large 
majority of the population. Once a critical mass was reached, a different self-
reinforcing process took off: increasing linguistic homogeneity favoured higher levels 
of social and geographical mobility and, conversely, higher levels of social and 
geographical mobility stimulated a growing process of linguistic homogenization.  
As Gellner
4 suggested, the ideal initial conditions for this process were given 
by situations where, as an unintended outcome of the power struggles among the 
political entities of agrarian societies, a single state ruled on a territory in which, 
despite the existence of many local dialects, there was a shared view of the dominant 
high culture. This was the case of England and France that were the first countries 
where a National state could foster the institutions of a national culture and of a 
national market (see case A in table 1).  
Germany and Italy shared with France and England the existence of a 
dominant high culture and language but lacked a state that could invest in their 
popularization and start the virtuous self-reinforcing process between cultural-
linguistic homogenization and increasing market mobility. Thus, in these two 
countries there was strong pressure to achieve national unity that, indeed, gave them 
the possibility to follow the development process of the early industrializers (see case 
B in table 1).   
However, the model could not be easily replicated in other parts of Europe. A 
symmetric case arose when more than one high culture existed within a well defined 
political unity that could command some loyalty from other elements; here the state 
could try to foster bilingualism and mutual cultural recognition as means of enhancing 
a virtuous circle between cultural standardisation and economic mobility but the 
process was far from easy (see case C in table 1). This type of process somehow 
                                                 
4 See Gellner (1983, 1998, and 1999). For an account of the important contributions of Ernest 
Gellner to Political Economy, see Pagano (2003).  
  4succeeded in Switzerland and Belgium, whereas it failed in the larger scale case of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire.  
Even more difficult was the case of areas that had neither a clearly defined dominant 
language and culture nor a political unity that could command a high degree of loyalty 
on the population living there. In this cases the raw material was rather unfit for the 
coming of the modern world of cultural standardisation and required often some 
rather brutal measures that in some most unfortunate cases took the form of ethnic 
cleansing (see case D in table 1). According to Gellner, in these cases, "violence and 
brutality seem to have been inscribed into the nature of the situation. The horror was 
not optional, it was predestined." (Gellner 1998 p. 54). Imposed ethnic separation (as 
the between Greek and Turkish or Pakistani and Indian communities) or ethnic 
cleansing (most recently in the former Yugoslavia) were the most evident expression 
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While the transition from agrarian to industrial market mobile societies is, in 
general, associated with a move from an institutional equilibrium characterised by 
linguistic-cultural differentiation and social-economic immobility to one characterised 
by linguistic-cultural standardisation and social-economic mobility, this move cannot 
be taken for granted by economic analysis and even less by policy makers. In 
different areas of the world the move has been more radical than in others: in Europe 
linguistic-cultural standardisation and social-economic mobility are far more limited 
than in the United States. The role of market and political competition, as well as the 




4. Social protection and cultural-linguistic standardisation: institutional 
complements and alternative insurance devices 
 
Ever since Adam Smith the advantages of a market economy have been 
associated with those related to the learning-by-doing-advantages entailed by the 
  5division of labour. Market economies allow individuals to get from others most of the 
goods they need through exchange and allow the specialization of economic activities. 
However, Coase (1937) and Marx well before him have convincingly argued that, 
even in modern industrial societies, specialized activities are co-ordinated by means 
other than market exchange.  
Indeed, pre-industrial agrarian societies often have a complex division of 
labour and a high degree of specialization. The social immobility and the static nature 
of these societies can favour a high degree of specialization. By contrast, the high 
economic and social mobility that characterises market societies may inhibit 
specialization and job-specific learning by doing – a consequence that would be at 
odds with the traditional Smithian wisdom according to which the degree of 
specialization is only limited by the extent of the market. The rise of nationalism and, 
in particular, cultural and linguistic standardisation can however greatly decrease the 
hazards of specialization in a mobile society by making each skill less specific and 
more easily employable in other occupations. In this sense, cultural and linguistic 
standardisation can act as a substitute for forms of social protection that redistribute 
income to the individuals made redundant by the fluctuations and structural changes 
that characterise the dynamic market economy. Both this kind of redistribution and 
cultural-linguistic standardisation can act as insurance devices against the hazards of 
market economies and make market mobility compatible with the drive towards 
specialization and its related Smithian productivity advantages. The more costly the 
cultural-linguistic standardisation process, the more convenient its (partial) 
substitution by forms of social solidarity. 
In other respects, cultural standardisation and social protection can be seen as 
two fundamental complementary institutions that favoured the emergence of a market 
economy. Nationalism favoured the dominance of a standardised high culture over a 
certain area and, at the same time, claimed that all the people sharing the same ethnic 
identity were "brothers" linked together by a special sense of solidarity. Nationalists 
pushed for both cultural standardisation and social protection and, moreover, the two 
objectives were, in many respects, mutually reinforcing. Cultural standardisation 
reinforced the sense of solidarity and made it easier to agree to forms of social 
protection. In turn, social protection favoured the feeling of belonging to the same 
"imagined community" and favoured the conditions under which local dialects and 
traditions could be abandoned for the national languages and the traditions defining 
the national identity. By contrast the social solidarity required by redistribution 
policies may suffer when there is no cultural-linguistic standardisation and, vice 
versa, the latter may be rather difficult when there is no shared feeling of solidarity 
among different ethnic groups. 
The relations of complementarity and substitution between social solidarity 
and cultural-linguistic standardisation create a difficult puzzle in situations in which 
both factors are lacking. 
On the one hand a low level of cultural-linguistic standardisation make 
redistributive policies more important because the liquidity of the skills of the losers 
is low. On the other hand, the same low-level of cultural-linguistic homogeneity may 
inhibit social solidarity and make it difficult to implement redistributive policies. 
Thus, redistributive policies are relatively more needed when they are more difficult.  
In order to understand better the nature of this difficulty, one should recall that, in the 
case of traditional national states, social solidarity had both a vertical and a horizontal 
dimension (solidarity among the individuals of the same region and among regions) 
that were associated to the overcoming of sharp vertical cultural divides among social 
  6classes and to the elimination of pronounced horizontal cultural differences among the 
territories of the national state (case 1 of Table 2).  
The United States departed from the traditional national states (case 1 of Table 
2). The horizontal homogeneity of the population of the different states (linguistic and 
also cultural) has gone together with a vertical cultural differentiation of the 
population due to ethnic division associated with its immigration history. Horizontal 
cultural homogeneity and vertical cultural differentiation have here been associated 
with a solidarity among different state that has gone rather disjoint from a strong 
feeling of solidarity within states. In these conditions, (horizontal) cultural 
standardisation has not been complemented by social protection and has only acted as 
a substitute insurance device. 
Europe, taken as a whole, offers a case symmetric to the United States (case 3 
of Table 2). European nations are culturally very heterogeneous but, until recently, 
European Nations have not had the vertical ethnic differentiation that has 
characterised the United States
5. It is not surprising that social solidarity and social 
protection has been much more pronounced as an insurance device within each state 
but that Europe, taken as a whole, has very little redistribution among its states. Both 
horizontal cultural homogeneity and reciprocal protection among states are very weak 
and, in a way polar to that of the U. S., the social protection offered by each national 
state is an important substitute for the lack of cultural horizontal homogenization. 
The worst future scenario for Europe (case 4 of Table 2) may be that, while 
horizontal cultural homogeneity and solidarity among its nations stay weak, 
immigration destroys, in a way similar to the American model, both vertical cultural 
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(Classic National states) 
(2) Regional Solidarity 




(3)Social Solidarity without 
Regional Solidarity 
(Europe) 
(4) No Social and No 
Regional Solidarity? 
(The future Europe?) 
 
The mild model of European federalism, which we consider in the following 
section, is meant to be one possible way to give Europe a future different from the (4) 
scenario.  
                                                 
5 Cultural class differences have often been more pronounced in Europe than the U.S. and, for 
this reason, despite ethnic differences, vertical mobility has been higher in the U.S. than in 
Europe. However, despite individual cases of amazing vertical mobility, the vertical hierarchy 
of the different group has not very much changes and seems, on average, to put severe 
constrains on the opportunities available to the members of each group. 
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5. A possible model of “mild European federalism” 
 
Economic theories of federalism based on a mix of the American experience 
and neoclassical theory provide a poor guide to the understanding of the nature of the 
European “mild” federalist project. While these theories consider the optimal 
clustering that could be obtained through the free mobility of individuals, the 
European project aims at a reduction of the costs of mobility and deals with all the 
issues related to the existence of costly mobility in situations of cultural and linguistic 
diversity. Federalism is a way of combining sunk linguistic and cultural investment 
with a common space that can be obtained by making most individuals bilingual and 
trilingual and/or accepting some common lingua franca: thus, in this respect, 
federalism is, at the same time, a way of encouraging individuals towards some 
limited mobility and a way of defending them against a too strong “forced” mobility 
that could destroy the specific cultural and linguistic identity of a particular place. 
Federalism is also both a way of creating some mild European identity
6 and 
preserving the identity of particular nations and regions. In some ways it can be 
regarded as an attempt to reproduce at European level case (c) of our table 1
7.  
European federalism can hardly be a sort of extension of the benefits of 
competition to the political market. It cannot take for granted the mobility of the 
individuals and must seek the creation of some minimum cultural-linguistic 
standardisation by the way of projects such as the Erasmus exchanges for University 
students or the Bologna process introducing equivalent degrees in European 
Universities. At the same time, it must protect individuals against the excesses of 
mobility by some redistribution in favour of the most disadvantaged regions. Europe 
faces the paradox that we have just considered at the end of the last section: in 
absence of cultural and linguistic homogenization, costly mobility implies that 
redistribution is the most useful when it may be the least acceptable. Thus, in the 
European case, the most important issues become how to foster a self-reinforcing 
dynamics between some moderate cultural-linguistic standardisation and some 
moderate mobility without upsetting regional and national identities and how to bring 
about some redistribution in favour of the poorest areas (that limits the need for 
mobility) without upsetting the slow process of creating a European solidarity. Since 
redistribution and cultural-linguistic standardisation are both complements and 
substitutes, this process requires smooth and balanced progresses in both directions. 
By contrast, abrupt movements only towards cultural-linguistic standardisation or 
only towards European-level redistribution are undesirable and, sometimes, 
dangerous. 
                                                 
6 To use Anderson's (1991) insightful expression Europe should become a "new imagined 
community" giving “symbolic utility" to individuals (Pagano 1995). The fact that this 
collective imagination is engineered by a long and somehow artificial process would not be a 
historical novelty but would rather make the “creation” of Europe very similar to the process 
of formation of many national identities (Hobsbawn 1992 and Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983).   
7 This is also the case that encompasses Belgium. It is therefore not surprising that, in a very 
stimulating paper, Van Parijs (2003) gives a qualified positive answer to the question; “Must 
Europe be Belgian?”.  
  8An excessive move towards cultural and linguistic standardisation can be 
undesirable if it is not complemented by a sense of European solidarity. Otherwise, 
the feelings of insecurity of the groups that are disadvantaged by the move may 
generate anti-European and pro-national feelings. Indeed, instead of an excessive push 
in this direction, redistribution policies may be preferred as a “better substitute” for 
cultural and linguistic standardisation in order to cope with the market uncertainties 
arising from specialization.   
An excessive move towards redistribution policies, which is not 
complemented by some cultural and linguistic standardisation, may also easily 
backfire. The “complementary” pre-existence of a shared culture and of a shared 
identity may be necessary for a widespread acceptance of solidaristic policies. An 
excessive emphasis on these policies is also undesirable because cultural 
standardisation could also have acted as a “better substitute”. Indeed, beyond a certain 
level, some form of cultural and linguistic standardisation could better achieve the 
same insurance results. 
While, within certain limits, American federalism can take for granted 
conditions of horizontal cultural and linguistic standardisation required by the 
mobility of the individuals and the competition among states, European federalism 
must, step by step, try to create some of these conditions. Only if these processes are 
successful in some dimensions, will some degree of state competition be helpful. In 
any case, a linguistically divided Europe will have to rely more on the protection of 
jobs and, in general, of  welfare of the individuals in their own nations and regions. If 
Europe cannot provide a substantial redistribution among regions and within regions, 
it must at least make redistribution possible within each single national state. 
Knowing that there is a better employer and a better welfare protection in another 
region will not help much in a culturally divided Europe. Increased political and 
market mobility must be complemented and, sometimes, substituted, more than in the 
American case, by locally based redistribution policies. 
 
 
6. Coping with globalization: a “European Insurance Scheme” among 
National welfare  states 
 
While the National state originated a self-reinforcing process between cultural 
standardisation and economic development, it opened a Pandora Box whose cultural 
and economic winds could hardly be contained forever within the boundaries of 
National states. Some National states (Britain with its Commonwealth and the United 
States with its federal system, with its frontier and with its melting pot of different 
ethnic groups) developed a sense of “global mission” and started doing to other 
languages and traditions what the national state had done within its boundaries.
8
 The 
                                                 
8According to Hardt and Negri (2000), the importance of the role of the United States in the 
process of globalization has been enhanced by its differences from traditional national states 
that stressed the role of ethnic identity. The legitimacy of the power of the U. S. has rather 
been based on the belief in the superiority of the American way of life that would mark the 
boundary between the civilized world and the various realms of evil. In this sense the power 
of the U.S. is not expressed in the imperialism typical of the traditional national states. It is 
rather grounded in its centrality in the Empire that should group together all the Civilized 
World. Since Civilization should not have limits in its struggle against the forces of evil, 
similarly the Empire (unlike the old forms of imperialism) should have no limits. 
  9advantages of mobility and cultural standardization could now be reaped at global 
level.  
  The resistance of national states has been often unsurprisingly strong. Even 
when the benefits of cultural standardization were clearly greater than their costs, the 
cultural standard was not a matter of indifference. The national state was now often 
there to try to stop the further advancement of that process of cultural homogenization 
that had been its main task and, perhaps, the fundamental reason for its existence. 
Globalization meant convergence and suppression of cultural differences in the same 
way in which the success of a national high culture had meant a decrease of cultural 
and institutional biodiversity within each country. The former cultural standardizers 
of the age of Nationalism have often become the victims of a historical nemesis that 
threatens the survival of their own traditions. 
Globalization marks a new age. It is different from the Empires that had in the 
past unified politically the part of the world that was known. The Roman Empire and, 
after that, the Holy Roman Empire never posed a comparable challenge to cultural 
diversity. They kept the universal culture and the lingua franca as the distinctive mark 
of the ruling classes. Modern globalization spreads the global culture well beyond a 
ruling minority and, in this sense, it may help to decrease inequalities. In the ancient 
empires political unity was not associated with cultural unity. Modern Globalism is 
different: while cultural unity may be a factor putting pressure towards greater 
political integration
9, political unity is rather weaker and it is mainly based on the 
dominance of the United States, on local processes of limited political integration 
such as the European Union and on some, often inadequate, governance by a few 
international institutions.  
Besides its enormously enlarged boundaries, the nature of modern globalism is also 
fundamentally different from nationalism. The politically united national state could 
decrease the risks of the market economy by using both universal cultural 
homogenization and some forms of social protection. While cultural homogenization 
was achieved through massive intervention in education, social protection required 
that the risks of the different productive sectors were not strongly correlated. Indeed, 
social insurance needed a production structure diversified in a considerable variety of 
sectors. Otherwise the Nation would have put too many eggs in too few baskets and 
would not be able to insure its citizens. 
Globalism lacks both the social insurance programmes and the universal 
access to education that characterised nation states. Moreover, it limits the capacity of 
national states to use either the insurance devices associated with redistribution and 
with the welfare  state or the insurance devices based on cultural and linguistic 
standardisation.  
In the absence of a reliable system of “international insurance” national states 
should compare the gains from trade due to international specialization with the risks 
entailed by reduced productive diversification. The balance of these two factors 
should involve an “optimal degree” of specialization. This degree of specialization 
will be less pronounced than the one that would be obtained by referring only to the 
“gross” gains from trade according the standard theory of comparative advantage; the 
“net” gains of international specialization should also take into account the growing 
                                                 
9 It is not inconsistent with this view that this integration may first occur among nations 
sharing the same civilization (common history, traditions and readings). However, it is an 
open issue whether this should be considered as first step for integration among these 
civilizations or lead to a disruptive clash among civilizations (see Huntington, 1997).  
  10costs of supplying internal social protection as the productive diversification of 
national economies decreases. Unfortunately this “optimal” level of specialization 
may be difficult to achieve in a globalized economy. Each single individual who 
moves to the sectors that have become more profitable as a result of international 
trade gains the full benefits of the new specialization. By contrast, she shares with all 
the other individuals of the same Nation the increased risk associated with the 
decrease of the number of productive sectors
10. Even if national governments realize 
the divergence between the private and social net benefits of specialization (and, 
often, they do not seem to do so!) it may well difficult to stop the individuals from 
specializing according to their own private benefits. An “international tragedy of the 
commons”, free riding on the “pasture” of productive diversification, may easily 
spread and increase insecurity in the global economy.    
Also the use of cultural standardization- the other instrument by which 
national economies have traditionally insured their citizens against the risks of market 
mobility - is seriously impeded in an internationally integrated economy. 
In the global economy, access to the dominant cultural standard is much more 
unequally distributed than in the case of national economies of the past. This 
inequality creates a division among workers endowed with mobile intellectual assets 
that are easily employable in the global economy and those that have skills that are 
less mobile and more specific to the national economy
11. The first workers may find it 
more convenient to replace social protection with cultural standardization as a form of 
insurance device and get out of the mutual insurance system that characterizes 
national states. Like financial capital these workers may become difficult to tax. Their 
relatively easy exit from a national system of mutual insurance makes it even more 
difficult to finance the traditional forms of social protection supplied by the national 
state and worsens the situation of those workers who cannot use the access to the 
global cultural standard as a (partial) substitute for social protection (D’Antoni, 
Pagano 2002).  Thus, in this respect, the present globalized world shows some 
puzzling (even, if perhaps, misleading) similarity with the ancient agrarian societies. 
Also here (especially in some of the countries where a language different from the 
Anglo-American tradition prevails) a cosmopolitan elite (but much more numerous 
than that existing in the agrarian societies!) speaks a new Latin that cannot be used as 
a working language by the majority of the population which, like in the agrarian 
societies, has only a limited horizontal and vertical mobility. While old forms of 
inequalities re-emerge in the modern globalized economy the national states, facing a 
shrinking tax base and increasingly correlated risks, are not able to offer to their 
citizens the security that they offered in the past. 
The dilemma posed in the process of European integration by the 
“complementarity-substitution” relation between cultural standardisation and social 
                                                 
10 Michele Di Maio has pointed out to me that issue is not only the quantity of the sectors but 
also their quality. Some sectors may be characterized by more fungible core competencies 
than others. 
11 This is the division that, according to Yael Tamir (2003), separates “globalists” and 
“communitarians” or, using a similar terminology, according to Bowles and Pagano (2004), 
separates  “cosmopolitans” from “provincials”. The divide is related to the divide between the 
global lingua franca and the other languages, which implies that many non-English-speaking 
countries have a differential access to the “cosmopolitan” standard. As Van Parijs (2002, p. 
72) points out “This ubiquitous asymmetric bilingualism is arguably very efficient. But 
nothing guarantees that it be fair.” Redistributive justice must therefore necessarily include 
the issue of linguistic justice.  
  11protection can be reframed in this general framework: in many respects, the process of 
European integration is simply part of the process of globalization and implies that 
economic integration makes it more difficult for each European economy to offer 
social protection in a situation of increasing productive specialization. European 
integration may create a dangerous division between “cosmopolitans” who are able to 
substitute cultural standardisation social insurance and “provincials” who find it hard 
to increase the “liquidity” of their skills. At the same time, Europe can offer some 
remedy for the fact that integration without forms of social insurance leads to 
excessively risky productive specialization.  
  If a European welfare state is rather difficult to conceive in the present 
circumstances, Europe may try to offer mutual insurances among the welfare states of 
the National Economies allowing their survival in situations in which these economies 
specialize within the European economic space and run increasingly correlated risks. 
While redistributions related to social insurance would occur within each single 
Nation according to its wealth, rules and political compromises, each welfare state 
could receive some insurance from the other welfare states
12.  




In a culturally and linguistically divided Europe, federalism cannot be 
considered a system based on an unfettered mobility that allows a free choice among 
different systems of social insurance and redistribution. It may rather require a system 
of mutual insurance among the different welfare systems that makes economic 
integration compatible with social protection (including protection against an 
“economically forced” mobility towards other states). While Europe may also 
promote (a limited) cultural standardisation at European level, the latter can be a 
substitute for social protection only at an increasing cost and can cause a dangerous 
clash between “cosmopolitans” and “provincials".  Only a system of mutual insurance 
among national welfare states can help the marriage between the European rich and 
creative cultural diversity and a process of economic and cultural integration that is 





                                                 
12 In principle, such system could make the increased specialization of each economy 
compatible with stable levels of social protection.  While in each country the number of 
sectors decreases and it becomes increasingly impossible to insure each national sector with 
the other productive sectors, the mutual insurance among the Welfare States would allow 
some sort of “indirect insurance” of each European productive sector with the other 
productive sectors. However, in real practice as well as in economic theory, insurance is 
always associated with a moral hazard problem and it is an open issue if and how a mild form 
of European federalism will be able to offer some indirect type of social insurance (and, at the 
same time, some limited common cultural standards compatible with the diversity of the 
European nations and regions). As a matter of fact, re-insurance companies, such as Munich 
Re or Swiss Re, are very important for the economic success of private insurance companies. 
The European Union could play an analogous re-insurance role with respect to National 
welfare states.  
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